Peer Punishment Promotes Enforcement of Bad Social Norms by Abbink, Klaus et al.
Chapman University
Chapman University Digital Commons
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research Philosophy
9-20-2017
Peer Punishment Promotes Enforcement of Bad
Social Norms
Klaus Abbink
Monash University
Lata Gangadharan
Monash University
Toby Handfield
Monash University
John Thrasher
Chapman University, thrasheriv@chapman.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/philosophy_articles
Part of the Family, Life Course, and Society Commons, Other Philosophy Commons, Other
Sociology Commons, Social Psychology and Interaction Commons, and the Sociology of Culture
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Abbink, Klaus, et al. “Peer Punishment Promotes Enforcement of Bad Social Norms.” Nature Communications, vol. 8, 2017, 609. DOI:
10.1038/s41467-017-00731-0
Peer Punishment Promotes Enforcement of Bad Social Norms
Comments
This article was originally published in Nature Communications, volume 8, in 2017. DOI: 10.1038/
s41467-017-00731-0
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Copyright
The authors
This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/philosophy_articles/28
ARTICLE
Peer punishment promotes enforcement of
bad social norms
Klaus Abbink1, Lata Gangadharan1, Toby Handﬁeld 2 & John Thrasher2
Social norms are an important element in explaining how humans achieve very high levels
of cooperative activity. It is widely observed that, when norms can be enforced by peer
punishment, groups are able to resolve social dilemmas in prosocial, cooperative ways. Here
we show that punishment can also encourage participation in destructive behaviours that are
harmful to group welfare, and that this phenomenon is mediated by a social norm. In a
variation of a public goods game, in which the return to investment is negative for both group
and individual, we ﬁnd that the opportunity to punish led to higher levels of contribution,
thereby harming collective payoffs. A second experiment conﬁrmed that, independently
of whether punishment is available, a majority of subjects regard the efﬁcient behaviour of
non-contribution as socially inappropriate. The results show that simply providing a
punishment opportunity does not guarantee that punishment will be used for socially
beneﬁcial ends, because the social norms that inﬂuence punishment behaviour may
themselves be destructive.
DOI: 10.1038/s41467-017-00731-0 OPEN
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Moral, social and legal norms are crucial in sustainingthe very high level of cooperation with non-relativesthat is observed in human societies. Norms involve a
commitment to behave in conformity with a rule, conditional on
sufﬁciently many others sharing the commitment to that rule.
They also may involve a commitment among some norm
followers to punish transgressions of the norm1–4. Punishment is
likely to be especially important for the maintenance of norms
that arise in social dilemmas, where there are conﬂicts between
individual and collective interests. Economics experiments using
public goods games show that providing subjects with the
opportunity to inﬂict punishment in a social dilemma promotes
higher levels of cooperation1. Although the losses created by
punishment sometimes outweigh the gains of cooperation1, 5–7,
coordination of punishment8 and also longer periods of repeated
interaction1, 9 make it very likely to be that cooperation will
spread and beneﬁt the group overall. In these cases, punishment
is likely to be used to promote norms of fairness, which have
prosocial effects. Punishment is used to increase social welfare
even at a personal cost to the punisher; hence, the term ‘altruistic
punishment’ has been coined to describe these phenomena1.
Not all norms, however, are socially beneﬁcial. For example,
in some cultures, norms of sexual purity motivate punishment
of transgressions, including so-called ‘honour killings’ of rape
victims10–12. Cultures of honour subscribe to norms that require
violent retaliation for trivial slights, often leading to devastating
escalations of violence13. Even apparently benign norms of gift-
giving have been identiﬁed as responsible for costly inefﬁciencies,
amounting to billions of dollars in annual deadweight loss14.
This study aims to investigate whether punishment will be
employed to establish socially costly norms in a paradigm
that resembles earlier public goods experiments. In typical
public goods games, some subjects appear to hold normative
attitudes that require positive, equal contributions from all
members. These attitudes are likely to combine elements
of fairness (‘we should all contribute equally’) and benevolence
(‘by contributing I/we make others better off’). We vary the
standard public goods design, however, by setting the social
beneﬁt from contributing to be zero or negative. That is, although
one individual’s contributions will beneﬁt the remainder of the
group, they do not make the group better off as a whole. In this
setting, normative attitudes that require positive contributions
will be potentially harmful to the collective. We hypothesise
that providing subjects with the opportunity to punish in
such games will allow these potentially damaging norms to
inﬂuence behaviour much more than they would in the
absence of punishment. Thus, groups provided with punishment
opportunities will contribute more and this outcome will
be mediated by the normative attitudes, held by at least some
subjects, requiring positive contributions.
As existing studies have used a paradigm in which cooperation
was beneﬁcial, it is unknown whether punishment can be used
to elicit destructive behaviour. On the one hand, it has been
suggested theoretically that if punishment is sufﬁciently potent, it
can institute any norm, no matter how foolish15. On the other
hand, it is also thought that psychological propensities to adopt
and enforce norms have been subject to signiﬁcant evolutionary
pressures, suggesting there may be signiﬁcant limitations on the
range of possible norms16. Although some existing evidence
suggests that ‘altruistic’ punishment has a dark side6, 17–20, our
study is the ﬁrst to provide experimental evidence that subjects
will enforce a destructive norm with punishment.
In a (linear) public good game, players are endowed with a
number of monetary units (MU), which they can either keep or
invest. Invested monies are multiplied by a factor called the
marginal per-capita return (MPCR) and every player in the group
receives the multiplied amount. If the MPCR is between 1/n and 1,
with n being the number of players, there is a social dilemma,
where the individual dominant strategy is to keep all one’s
endowment, while social welfare is maximised if everybody
invests all. This is the environment where punishment has proven
to be effective to enforce cooperation in previous experiments.
In this study we remove the social dilemma aspect from the
game. In two treatments (P25 and P20) we set the MPCR to 0.25
and 0.2, respectively, where n= 4. In the former, there is no
welfare gain from investments; in the latter, investments actually
lower the group payoff: every dollar contributed leads to a payoff
of $0.80, divided equally between the four members. In two
baseline treatments (N25 and N20), subjects play the same games,
but without a punishment opportunity.
We ﬁnd that punishment signiﬁcantly increases contributions,
in both the neutral and the destructive environments. A second
experiment demonstrates that subjects have shared attitudes
that it is appropriate to contribute more than ﬁve units and
inappropriate to contribute zero. This ﬁnding suggests that
punishment in the ﬁrst experiment is being used to enforce a
social norm, even though in the present environment the effect
of that norm is harmful, or at best neutral, with respect to
group payoffs.
Results
Contributions and punishment. Eighty-three out of 116 subjects
(72%) in punishment treatments punished at least once. As
hypothesised, contributions were higher in the punishment
treatments than in the controls. In P25, the average contribution
per subject, per round was 5.6 MU; in N25, without punishment,
it was 1.6. In P20, the average contribution per subject, per
round was 3.4; in N20, without punishment, it was 0.7.
Both differences are statistically signiﬁcant (one-sided, Fisher’s
two-sample randomisation test21, P25 vs. N25: p= 0.002, P20 vs.
N20: p= 0.007).
We report in Table 1 average punishments dispensed and
received by subjects who contributed more or less than the mean
amount contributed on a given round by their three co-players.
Consistent with earlier ﬁndings, most punishment is dispensed by
high contributors and most punishment is received by low
contributors1, 22. A regression model, described in Supplementary
Table 1, supports this result.
In Fig. 1, we report time series of contributions for each
of the four treatments. Contributions start out high, but in the
non-punishment treatments they decay signiﬁcantly. Similar to
other public goods experiments, we ﬁnd that punishment
stabilises contributions at a signiﬁcantly higher level22, 23.
We also observe, consistent with earlier ﬁndings23, that higher
rates of return lead to higher contributions (Fisher’s two-sample
randomisation test, one-tailed p= 0.066 across the treatments
without punishment, p= 0.071 across the treatments with
punishment). Attempts to determine whether the mere threat
of punishment was sufﬁcient to maintain high contributions were
inconclusive (Supplementary Fig. 1).
Table 1 Average amounts of punishment per round
dispensed and received by high and low contributors
Above average
contributors
Below average
contributors
Punishment dispensed 1.17 (0.08) 0.47 (0.05)
Punishment received 0.35 (0.04) 1.20 (0.06)
Standard errors in parentheses
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Earnings. Contributions were destructive in the MPCR= 0.2
treatments and so because contributions were higher in P20 than
in N20, group earnings were lower. Net of any expenditure
on punishment, subjects in the punishment treatment earned
10.8 MU less on average over the course of the experiment.
Normative attitudes. One possible explanation for punishment
behaviour—that subjects engaged in retaliatory counter-punish-
ment for having been punished in earlier rounds—was precluded
by the design of our experiment. Subjects were not advised who
had punished them on any given round and subject identiﬁers
were randomly assigned every round, making it difﬁcult to
identify who was responsible for past punishment received.
A post-experiment survey asked subjects to explain why they
penalised other players (ﬁrst person punishment) and to indicate
why they believed others may have penalised them (second
person punishment). In both punishment treatments, there was
negligible evidence of retaliatory motives and the reasons most
commonly cited were reasons relating to fairness and increasing
contributions, as opposed to personal beneﬁt or spite, consistent
with our hypothesis that normative motivations were a signiﬁcant
factor (see Fig. 2, also Supplementary Table 2 and Supplementary
Fig. 2).
The evidence from our post-experimental survey, however, is
open to alternative interpretations about normative motivations.
Punishment may have given rise to higher levels of contributions
if some subjects used the threat of penalties to extort contribu-
tions from other group members. This behaviour would still be
consistent with an attempt to ‘increase contributions’, but would
not be a normative motivation, because it makes no reference to
the beliefs of others as to what is socially or morally appropriate.
One might further doubt the veracity of any explanations offered
after the experiment, given that they may reﬂect self-serving
biases.
Consequently, to determine whether the subjects in our
original experiment shared a relevant norm, we conducted a
second experiment, in which subjects were shown the instructions
from either the P20 or N20 treatments of the ﬁrst experiment and
then asked to identify the appropriateness of each possible
contribution level. We restricted our second experiment to an
investigation of the MPCR= 0.2 environment, because this is the
setting in which the existence of a norm requiring positive
contributions is outright destructive and hence most perverse.
Social norms can inﬂuence behaviour, even among those who
reject the norm, because many agents regard it as important to be
seen to do the right thing by the lights of the broader
community2, 3, 24, 25. In eliciting beliefs about norms, it is
therefore important to ﬁnd out what each subject thinks the other
subjects believe, rather than to elicit individual opinions about
what is right. Adapting a methodology that has been successfully
used to study second-order beliefs about norms in other
settings26, 27, we gave subjects an incentive to accurately identify
what they believed other subjects believed by offering a monetary
reward for identifying the response which was given most
frequently.
To determine whether normative beliefs are liable to vary
across the treatment settings or to change through the course of
play, we employed four treatments in a two-by-two design. In the
‘zero-base’ treatments, P20z and N20z, subjects read the
instructions from the original experiment and were asked to
evaluate the appropriateness of each possible contribution in the
very ﬁrst round. In the ‘history’ treatments, P20h and N20h,
subjects read the same instructions but were also shown a
sequence of play that actually occurred in the ﬁrst 19 rounds of
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Fig. 1 Time series of mean aggregate group contributions per round. a MPCR= 0.2, P20 treatment with punishment (orange), N20 without punishment
(blue); b MPCR= 0.25, P25 treatment with punishment (orange), N25 without punishment (blue). (N20, n= 15, P20, n= 15; N25, n= 14; P25, n= 14)
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Fig. 2 Relative frequency of reasons cited to explain punishment. First
person reasons are responses to: ‘What was the main reason that you
deducted points from the other members in your group?’ Second person
reasons are responses to: ‘What do you think is the main reason that others
may have deducted points from you?’ Solid arrows point to reasons
cited signiﬁcantly more frequently than the alternative, at the group level
(two-tailed binomial test; red arrows p< 0.1, black arrows p< 0.05; dashed
lines NS). The more prosocially oriented reasons, fairness and to increase
contributions, are in the upper circles of each ﬁgure. P20 (a, b), n= 15;
P25 (c, d), n= 14
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the initial experiment. Subjects were then asked to evaluate the
appropriateness of all possible contributions in the ﬁnal round.
We ﬁnd compelling evidence that there was a norm requiring
positive contributions. Subjects ranked the appropriateness
of each possible contribution on a four-point Likert scale, which
we converted to numerical scores on a linear scale from − 1
(very inappropriate) to + 1 (very appropriate). Average appro-
priateness scores for all contributions are displayed in Fig. 3.
There is a consistent pattern across all treatments: low
contributions are regarded as inappropriate, whereas high
contributions are regarded as appropriate. Aggregating all our
treatments, we observe that more than half of subjects rated
contributing zero as very inappropriate. Half of subjects rated
contributing one, two or three units as at least somewhat
inappropriate and one quarter rated these as very inappropriate.
Conversely, half of subjects rated contributions at every level
greater than nine as at least somewhat appropriate and at least
one quarter of subjects rated these positive contribution levels as
very appropriate. The average appropriateness assessment given
across all positive contribution levels is signiﬁcantly higher than
the appropriateness of making a zero contribution (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, z= –4.554, p< 0.0001). Conducting the same
test within treatments, we found that in the zero base treatments,
the same difference in attitudes was statistically signiﬁcant
(P20z: z= –3.181, p= 0.002; N20z: z= –3.684, p= 0.0002), but
that it did not achieve signiﬁcance within the history treatments
(see also Supplementary Table 3). We further sought to
investigate whether normative attitudes were affected by either
the opportunity to punish or the observation of earlier rounds of
play. To do this, we compared the distribution of normative
attitudes towards contributing zero in each treatment (see Fig. 4).
Contributing zero is a salient option to analyse, because it is not
only uniquely efﬁcient but also the contribution level that was
most frequently punished, thus it is a focal point for the tension
between efﬁciency and normative expectations. Subjects are more
approving of contributing zero in the history treatments
compared to the respective zero base treatments, though this is
only statistically signiﬁcant for N20h vs. N20z (Mann–Whitney
test, z= –3.105, p< 0.002). This can presumably be ascribed to an
intrinsic difference in normative attitudes towards contributions
at the beginning vs. the end of the experiment, or to a learning
effect experienced by subjects who are exposed to histories of
play: subjects may be coming to disapprove of the inefﬁciency of
the norm or they may be adjusting their belief about what others
expect in light of the decline in contributions that happens over
time. A similar pattern is observed for most contribution levels:
normative attitudes (both positive and negative) are less extreme
in the history treatments. The decline is only signiﬁcant, however,
for contribution levels 1 through 4 and only in non-punishment
treatments. This is suggestive that punishment is stabilising the
normative expectations against a tendency to otherwise decay.
There is further evidence that punishment is stabilising
normative attitudes, derived from a closer examination of the
P20h treatment. Subjects in history treatments were shown
courses of interaction that actually occurred in the ﬁrst 19 rounds
of Experiment 1 (each of the 15 group histories was shown to
precisely 2 subjects in Experiment 2), so subjects in P20h saw a
variety of different amounts of punishment dispensed (mean 39,
median 12, ranging from 1 to 277). Figure 5 shows the association
between the total amount of punishment observed by subjects
and their normative attitude towards contributing zero. A linear
regression on this data is of doubtful value, given the small
number of observations, and the highly skewed distribution of
punishment levels, but a non-parametric test of association such
as Spearman’s rank correlation conﬁrms that the data are almost
certainly associated: subjects who observe higher punishment
levels tend to have stronger judgments condemning zero
contributions as inappropriate (ρ= –0.665, p= 0.0001, n= 30).
Discussion
Our key ﬁnding is that in the presence of punishment
opportunities, destructive and inefﬁcient norms can exert a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on behaviour. This is important and
surprising, not least because the experiment involves only a very
subtle modiﬁcation of a design that powerfully demonstrates the
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Fig. 3 Mean appropriateness scores for all contribution levels, for each treatment. In all treatments, subjects tend to judge contributions levels > 5 as
appropriate and < 5 as inappropriate. Numerical scores are derived from a linear scaling of subject’s categorical responses on a Likert scale ranging from −1
(very inappropriate) to +1 (very appropriate). N for the treatments: N20z= 26, N20h= 30, P20z= 29, P20h= 30
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cooperative beneﬁts of punishment9. Our results show that
punishment supports not merely cooperative behaviour, but
also destructive behaviour. These results are consistent with
theoretical ﬁndings that punishment can stabilise any social
equilibrium, cooperative or destructive15, 28 and previous
experimental work on destructive behaviour19.
Three further questions arise: ﬁrst, are there alternative
explanations of our observations, not involving social norms?
Second, what was the content of the destructive norm that
emerged? Third, how robust is the long-term stability of
destructive norms?
We have observed not only that subjects sometimes
contributed, but that those who contributed tended to punish
non-contributors also. We further observed a relatively
non-normal distribution of contribution levels. Many individuals
contributed very low amounts, some contributed very high
amounts, but relatively few contributed intermediate amounts
(see Supplementary Fig. 3).
This behaviour could be the result of a certain sort of social
preference, without necessarily involving a social norm. The hall-
marks of a social norm are that (i) a sufﬁciently large proportion of
the population approves of a certain sort of behaviour, conditional
on others having similar attitudes, and (ii) a sufﬁciently large
proportion of the population (not necessarily the same proportion
as in (i)) disapproves of non-compliance, and may be willing
to sanction non-compliance2. Social norms are therefore highly
suited to explaining behavioural regularities that are enforced by
punishment.
An alternative possibility is that the population has a widely
shared, but ‘unconditional’ attitude. For instance, many subjects
may approve of generous behaviour, both by themselves and their
fellow group members, but held this attitude regardless of
their fellow group members’ attitudes. Punishment may be used
by such subjects both to express their approval and to change
the behaviour of fellow group members. This second possibility
is what we might call a ‘moral’ commitment: moral ideals are–at
least in theory29, 30–supposed to be especially robust, even in the
face of community disagreement. Thus a moral revolutionary can
have moral ideals that are at odds with the broader community,
whereas it is not conceptually possible to have social norms that
are at odds with the entire broader community (although of
course it is possible to have subcultures that have distinctive
norms—the point is that there must be some community whose
consensus constitutes the norm).
The technique we used to elicit normative attitudes does not
reliably discriminate between these possibilities. Therefore, we
cannot rule out the possibility of a moral commitment explaining
the behaviour we observe. However, one signature of a social
norm being present is that it will tend to turn a social dilemma
into something like a coordination game2, 24, 31, 32. Because of
the interdependent structure of preferences, there will be
multiple equilibria: typically a high-compliance equilibrium
and a low-compliance equilibrium. At the high-compliance
equilibrium, subjects believe that other group members will
comply, and so to avoid the stigma of non-compliance, it is a best
response to comply. At the low-compliance equilibrium, subjects
believe that very few other group members will comply, and while
there may be some honour involved in compliance, there is no
shame in not complying. Thus, for most subjects, the best
response is to not comply. Subjects who are moved by a moral
commitment, however, may continue to contribute, even when
no one else in the group is doing so. Given some heterogeneity in
moral commitments, we would therefore expect to see behaviour
that does not resemble a coordination equilibrium, but rather
contribution behaviour distributed randomly across groups. The
most extreme sort of moral commitment would be completely
insensitive, not only to the contributions of other players, but
also to the punishment decisions. This would predict that the
distribution of contributions should be randomly distributed
across groups.
This toy prediction, however, is not only unrealistic in its
assumption that players are insensitive to punishment, it also
neglects the possibility that a moral commitment may involve
some concept of reciprocity. The reciprocator thinks that
‘one good turn deserves another’ and perhaps unkind behaviour
deserves retaliation also33, 34, so a preference for reciprocity is a
preference to behave kindly or harshly, conditional on the
behaviour of others. The distinction between an unconditional
preference for conditional generosity (i.e., a moral commitment
to reciprocity) vs. a conditional preference for unconditional
generosity (i.e., a social norm of generosity) is far more subtle
than most experimental methods can detect. We do not insist that
either is superior for the purposes of explaining our present
ﬁndings (see the Supplementary Discussion for further remarks
that relate our ﬁndings to extant models of social norms and
social preferences). Rather, we suggest that both social norms and
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moral commitments are likely to be involved in the complete
explanation of the observed phenomena. Morally committed
individuals, who are willing to make contributions independently
of community attitudes, are likely to play an important role in
initiating an expectation that contributions are appropriate. The
example they set is then liable to affect the conditional attitudes of
those who lack moral commitments, but are more concerned to
comply with whatever is approved of by the majority.
Regarding the content of the norm, as we have already alluded
to above, the present study does not offer decisive evidence in this
regard. That said, there are two salient possibilities that seem
likely to have played a role in explaining the ﬁndings. The ﬁrst
is a norm related to fairness: the thought being something like,
‘If I am contributing, you should make a similar contribution,
otherwise you’re beneﬁting at my expense’. This sort of norm is
thought to be operative in typical cooperative settings35–37, and is
naturally extended to the present context. Norms that draw on
notions of fairness crucially involve a reciprocal element: what is
required of one agent depends on what they have received from
other agents. The second possibility dispenses with this condi-
tional element: a norm of generosity simply requires that those
who have resources share them with others. This sort of norm
appears to be operative in asymmetric paradigms such as dictator
games, and subjects have been observed making positive
contributions even in inefﬁcient dictator games, where each unit
sacriﬁced by the dictator yields a diminished return for the
recipient38. Both hypotheses are consistent with the survey
responses we obtained, and discriminating further between these
hypotheses may be difﬁcult, because subjects themselves may not
be certain precisely what norm is operating in this setting.
Given the very limited social and contextual cues available to
subjects in a laboratory setting, and given the limited means of
communication, the evidence that subjects normally use to
identify social norms is diminished.
It may be perplexing that either a norm of fairness or of
generosity requires behaviour that does not beneﬁt—and may
even harm—the group as a whole, but it should not be surprising
to think that norm-followers may be somewhat blind to the
consequences of their behaviour. Social norms rely on general
assent and informal, decentralised enforcement. In comparison
with formal rules such as laws and regulations, there will be
inherent limits on their complexity and on the ability of a
population to change its norms to adapt to novel circumstances39.
Norms therefore rely on familiar and intelligible structures,
such as prohibitions on actions, rather than assessment of
consequences2, 40. In the present case, contributing is indeed an
example of generous behaviour: it beneﬁts the other group
members, although at some cost to the donor. (Indeed, it
resembles institutions like the exchange of gifts at Christmas,
which is similarly both generous and inefﬁcient.) If some, but not
all, group members make contributions, then it also ﬁts a simple
description of ‘unfairness’: some group members are beneﬁting at
the expense of others. Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that
at least some subjects think that contributing is required by one
or both of these norms. Given the opportunity to express this
attitude via punishment, these individuals may entrench the
norm, to everyone’s detriment.
The apparently rigid and unthinking adherence to an
inefﬁcient norm is also illustrative of a more general phenomenon
regarding norm enforcement. It is widely observed that punitive
judgments are insensitive to consequences, and can be
best explained by a retributive ‘eye for an eye’ type of rule
that matches the degree of punishment with the degree of
transgression41, 42. Game theoretic considerations suggest that
retaliatory behaviour has to be inﬂexible in this manner or it will
be ineffective43, 44. Similarly, in the present experiment, agents
who enforce norms only when it is efﬁcient to do so will be
unable to use costly punishment at all (because punishment is
inherently inefﬁcient in the short term). This can be helpful
where punishment is used to enforce norms that are socially
beneﬁcial, but can also lead to a disturbingly rigid commitment
to whatever norms happen to arise. Our ﬁndings therefore
suggest that once a norm is established through punishment,
it can remain stable even though it may be collectively harmful.
Repugnant customs may persist without observable coercion
because of the mere existence of members of the group who
are willing to punish non-compliers2, 37. Extending this research
and understanding the stability of bad norms in the face of
punishment will be crucial for understanding these social
norms outside the lab and, most importantly, how they might
be changed.
Methods
Experiment 1. The basis of our analysis is the long-run public goods game with
and without punishment1. This game is typically used to test how the presence of
punishment can change the incentives to free-ride or contribute to some shared
public good. In the classic public goods game, the returns for each player are
greater if each contributes to the group account, but there is also an incentive to not
contribute and to still reap the beneﬁts of the public good. Real world examples of
this scenario include the use of open access lands for the grazing of livestock and
environmental degradation, the management of shared water resources and
irrigation, and more speculative examples such as the development of altruism and
social institutions. The robust lab result of these experiments is that the threat
of punishment, either from third-parties37 or from within the group1, 9, 22, will
reliably encourage greater contribution to the public resource and stabilise
cooperation over time. There are also, however, theoretical models yet to be
experimentally tested15, which show that punishment can enforce any kind
of group norm, whether cooperative or not. To test this idea, we created a
non-efﬁcient group contribution game to see if punishment would enforce bad,
inefﬁcient, norms, as well as cooperative ones.
Our design closely followed the paradigm of Gächter et al.9, with the exceptions
that: (i) our groups consisted of four players rather than three and (ii) the rate of
return is lowered, so depending on the treatment, contribution has either no effect
on group payoff (treatment P25, MPCR = 0.25) or is inefﬁcient (P20, MPCR = 0.2).
The game lasts for 20 rounds and at the beginning of each round players are
endowed with 30 MU (AUD $1.20) in addition to a AUD $8 show up fee. In each
round, players may contribute up to 20 MU to a group account with either a
MPCR of 0.25 or 0.20. In the ﬁrst treatment (MPCR 0.25), there is no group beneﬁt
to making contributions and in the second treatment (MPCR 0.20), the expected
return is negative. (The additional 10 MU endowment that cannot be contributed
to the group account is to ensure a reserve of funds which players in punishment
treatments can spend on penalising other players.)
Investment decisions were made simultaneously and subjects were not able to
communicate with one another. Subjects were informed after each round of the
contributions of other group members. The identiﬁers for the other players in a
group were randomly reassigned in each round, such that counter-punishment
across rounds was ruled out.
After contributions were made and shown to the group, players were able to
assign penalty points (referred to as deduction points in the instructions) to other
players in their group. Penalty points cost 1 MU (AUD $0.04) to assign and
reduce the earnings of the player they are assigned to by 3 MU (AUD $0.12). Both
the no-beneﬁt (MPCR 0.25) and negative-return (MPCR 0.20) treatments were run
with a penalty round and a baseline treatment where players are not able to assign
penalty points. There are four total treatments with 20 rounds each: no-beneﬁt
treatments with punishment (P25) and without (N25), as well as negative-return
treatments with punishment (P20) and without (N20).
In Gächter et al.9, the participants are either in a 10-round or 50-round
treatment and found that there was little change in the later rounds after 20 rounds.
We therefore concluded that 10 rounds is too few observations, whereas 50 rounds
seems to be unnecessary and settled on 20 rounds as an appropriate number. Our
results suggest that even this may have been unnecessary as in both the punishment
and no-punishment treatments in the negative-return cases group behaviour
stabilises around round 10.
We collected data from a total of 232 subjects who participated in 58 groups.
Subjects earned an average of AUD 35.68, including an AUD 8 show-up fee. All the
interactions in the experiment took place anonymously via computer terminals.
We used the experimental software z-Tree on computers in the Monash Laboratory
for Experimental Economics (MonLEE) laboratory45. ORSEE software was used to
recruit subjects46. The instructions provided to subjects are provided in
Supplementary Note 1.
We conducted our experiment at the MonLEE at Monash University in
Melbourne, Australia. The subject pool was relatively balanced between genders,
with 112 females and 118 males. The average age of our subjects was 22.5 years.
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Subjects were all students, and described their areas of study as Engineering (30%),
Economics (9%), Other Business (19%), Sciences (14%), Psychology (2%) and
Other (26%).
After arrival, the participants were randomly assigned to computer
terminals separated by barriers to preserve anonymity. Subjects were then
presented with a set of written instructions, which were read aloud to the
entire group. Subjects were then required to solve several quiz questions
(Supplementary Note 3) on their terminals and the group session would not
begin until every member of the group had successfully completed these
questions. The quiz was conducted to make sure that all subjects understood
the instructions and how their payoffs were calculated.
After the public goods game, we administered an anonymous survey to the
subjects (ﬁnal earnings included compensation for their time spent answering the
questions). The survey helped us obtain general demographic information and
responses to questions intended to elicit information about subjects’ normative
attitudes towards levels of contribution. Two of the questions invited qualitative
responses. To analyse this data, a research assistant who was blind to the research
questions of this study was invited to code the answers on the basis of whether they
cited reasons such as fairness, personal beneﬁt, or revenge. The survey questions,
the instructions for the research assistant and the qualitative responses to the
survey questions are provided in Supplementary Notes 4–6.
The experiment took ~1 h for the punishment treatments and around half an
hour for the non-punishment treatments.
Experiment 2. One hundred and ﬁfteen subjects played a pure matching
coordination game44, in which they were rewarded for picking the most commonly
chosen rating of evaluation for a possible action in one of the treatments of the ﬁrst
experiment. Subjects read the instructions of the N20 or P20 treatments from
Experiment 1 and were then given a quiz to test comprehension of the game.
Subjects in history treatments were asked to identify, on a four-point Likert scale,
the appropriateness of all possible contribution levels on round 20, having been
shown an actual history from the original experiment. Subjects in zero-base
treatments made the corresponding assessment for all possible contributions in
round 1. The instructions provided to subjects are given in Supplementary Note 2.
In the history treatments, each group history from experiment 1 was shown to
precisely two subjects, ensuring that responses reﬂected a representative exposure
to the behaviour that occurred in experiment 1.
One of the response items was randomly chosen to be the basis for reward.
Subjects earned $10 for participation and an additional $10 for choosing the most
common response on this item.
The study design was approved by the Monash University Human Research
Ethics Committee, approval no. CF15/1440–2015000693. Informed consent was
obtained from all subjects.
Statistical methods. The statistics presented in the main paper are all
non-parametric tests and thus do not make any distributional assumptions
about the data.
Data availability. All data on which the ﬁndings of this study are based are
available at https://ﬁgshare.com/s/1dc581ff601213c35e83.
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